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Abstract 
 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was an attempt to “jump-start 
the economy to create and save jobs” by inducing state spending on an enormous 
scale. 787 billion US dollars were allocated to the act, which included tax cuts and 
extension of benefits under Medicaid, but also major investment programs. Under the 
recovery act, 28 government agencies were each allocated a portion of the available 
funds, and then decided how to spend the money. Most of the money was awarded as 
grants, loans or contracts to state governments, which then distributed it further to 
specific projects. 
 
However, while the recovery act may have avoided an even deeper recession, it has 
largely failed to jump-start the American economy in the intended way. Could it be 
that the stimulus had less effect than it could have had, because of corruption? 
Research shows that corruption increases costs of public investment, and reduces the 
efficiency of public spending. In this paper, I attempt to gauge the effects of 
corruption on the stimulus package by comparing projects awarded grants in the 50 
US states, using a two-level modeling strategy. First, for each state, the cost of a 
project is modelled as a function of the number of people employed in the project, 
which yields a job cost coefficient. The assumption is that a lower coefficient implies 
more efficient spending, since projects with the same amount of labor cost more when 
the coefficient is higher. 
 
Second, the job cost coefficient is modelled as a function of corruption in the state, 
controlling for other state-level factors. Corruption is measured as the number of 
convictions for corruption in the state 1976-2009 (Glaeser & Saks 2006). The 
empirical analysis shows that the job cost coefficient is higher in states where more 
public officials have been convicted for corruption, implying that corruption may 
have impaired the possible effect of the stimulus package. 
 
 
 
 
 
Anders Sundell 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
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Introduction 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was an attempt to “jump-start the 
economy to create and save jobs” by inducing state spending on an enormous scale. 787 
billion US dollars were allocated to the act, which included tax cuts and extension of benefits 
under Medicaid, but also major investment programs. Under the recovery act, 28 government 
agencies were each allocated a portion of the available funds, and then decided how to spend 
the money. Most of the money was awarded as grants, loans or contracts to state 
governments, which then distributed it further to specific projects. 
 
However, while the recovery act, according to reporting by the recipients, has created over 
600,000 jobs, it has largely failed to jump-start the American economy in the intended way. 
Notable commentators, like Nobel memorial prize in economic sciences laurate Paul 
Krugman, have argued that the stimulus package was too small to generate the intended effect 
(Krugman, 2009). Congressional republican leadership has instead argued that the package 
was too big, and packed with wasteful pork spending (CNN, 2009). 
 
Regardless of whether the economy would have been better served by a larger or smaller 
package, it may be that the stimulus had less effect than it could have had, because of 
corruption. As observers of another recovery act have put it, requiring the government to 
spend a large amount of money during a set time period is a “recipe for corruption” (Kroleski, 
Reville, & Mangiero, 2009). 
 
In this paper, I attempt to gauge the effects of corruption on the stimulus package, by 
comparing projects awarded grants in the 50 US states, using a two-level modeling strategy. 
First, for each state, the cost of a project is modelled as a function of the number of people 
employed in the project, which yields a job cost coefficient. The assumption is that a lower 
coefficient implies more efficient spending. Second, the job cost coefficient is modelled as a 
function of corruption in the state, controlling for other state-level factors. The empirical 
analysis shows that the job cost coefficient is higher in states where more public officials have 
been convicted for corruption, implying that corruption impairs the possible effect of the 
stimulus package. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, previous research on corruption in general and it‟s 
effects on public investment is presented, together with the theory that guides the empirical 
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analysis. Second, data and empirical strategy is discussed. Results are presented in the third 
section, while the fourth section concludes. 
 
Previous research and theory  
The stimulus package has for natural reasons not been the subject of many scholarly studies 
yet. There are however some unpublished conference papers dealing with the allocation of 
stimulus funds. De Rugy (2010) takes a critical view, arguing that congressional democrats 
are advantaged in allocation of funds: more funds are allocated to congressional house 
districts where a democrat holds the seat. De Rugy also criticized the ARRA in a testimony 
before congress. Young & Sobel (2010) echo this sentiment, arguing that the stimulus is a 
poor Keynesian counter-cyclical policy. Allocation, according to Young & Sobel, seems more 
guided by political concerns than macroeconomical. 
 
Reifler & Lazarus (2010) criticize de Rugy, claiming that de Rugy fails to take into account 
the factors that are supposed to guide allocation of funds, such as the existance of research 
universities or military bases in the congressional district. Controlling for a host of these 
factors, the coefficient for the party of the house representative fails to achieve significance. 
Reifler & Lazarus thus conclude that the stimulus is allocated on proper grounds. Their 
findings however contrast sharply with those of Young & Sobel, which use a similar 
approach, but come to different conclusions. A possible explanation for this paradox is that 
the analysis of Reifler & Lazarus is carried out on the congressional district level, while 
Young & Sobel compare states. 
 
To discuss the effects of corruption on economic efficiency, it is first necessary to define what 
corruption is. While there are plenty of definitions, a widely used one is that corruption is the 
misuse of public office for private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 2008). Public officials may be both 
politicians and bureaucrats. 
 
For long, the effects of corruption on economic efficiency and growth were understudied, and 
several scholars argued that corruption possibly could have beneficial effects. For instance, 
Leff (1964) argued that corruption could stimulate economic growth by increasing 
competition among bureaucrats in the government bureaucracy and thereby increasing 
governmental efficiency. It could also work as a “hedge” against bad governmental policies, 
by allowing entrepreneurs to implement their favored policies, aided by corrupted 
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bureaucrats. Moreover, corruption could also reduce uncertainty, in that entrepreneurs need 
not fear governmental intervention as much when the bureaucracy is corrupted. Bribes could 
also act as “speed money”, and reduce government inefficiency (Mauro, 1995). 
 
Needless to say, an underlying tendency in this strand of research is low trust in government. 
Governmental policies are seen as intervening in an efficient market and bureacratic rigidity 
and inefficiency is seen as impeding growth. However, a large and growing body of literature 
has pointed to the importance of „Weberian‟ bureaucratic structures. In Weber‟s classical 
work, the ideal bureacracy was characterized among other things by hierarchical organization, 
meritocratic recruitment, predictable careers for bureaucrats and rule-governed decision-
making (Evans & Rauch, 1999). In this radically different perspective bureaucratic rigidity 
instead serves to increase predictability, and ensures impartial treatment for all who deal with 
the bureaucracy. 
 
Empirical studies demonstrating the negative effects of corruption on economic growth and 
performance now abound (Evans & Rauch, 1999; Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001), and this is 
reflected in policy shifts among policymakers, for instance the World Bank (Holmberg, 
Rothstein, & Nasiritousi, 2009). 
 
How then, could corruption in the state governments affect the efficiency of the stimulus 
package? Two mechanisms are proposed, one direct and one indirect.  
 
The direct mechanism builds on the model proposed by Dal Bó & Rossi (2007). They argue 
that the price of output by firms in non-corrupt countries is close to the “technical price”, i.e. 
the cost of producing the output as cheaply as possible. In corrupt countries on the other hand, 
regulators can be subject to bribery, and can then allow prices that are higher than necessary. 
This should be especially true when the public officials that are subject to bribery not only are 
regulators, but also buyers of the services. As Dal Bó and Rossi also acknowledge, corruption 
can also be initiated by the officials themselves. Furthermore, public officials could also 
siphon off a part of grants by inflating costs and taking a part of the money for themselves. 
 
Among the sentences delivered in 2009, none concern grants or contracts related to the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. This is perhaps to be expected, given that it takes 
some time to discover corruption schemes, and prosecute them. Examples of corruption in 
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relation to the awarding of contracts however abound. For instance, William R. Dodson, a 
building manager for the United States General Services Administration, was in 2009 
sentenced to 15 months of imprisonment. Dodson had received $31,800 in cash and $4,600 
worth of services from a contracting company that were awarded $294,926 in contracts 
(Department of Justice, 2010, p. 34). There are also examples of downright theft by public 
employees. Violet Williams, employed by the Department of Energy, submitted attendance 
records for 2,415 overtime hours more than she worked, rendering Williams $94,494 in undue 
compensation (2010, p. 41). 
 
The indirect mechanism is that corruption increases the cost of projects by raising transaction 
costs in general. Even while no actual corruption may be involved when the grants are 
awarded, the corrupt climate makes it harder to do business. Projects are likely slowed down 
if it is necessary to pay bribes to acquire necessary permits and licenses. Simply put – 
transaction costs increase because the number of necessary transactions (bribes) is higher. 
 
There is to the best of my (admittedly very limited) knowledge surprisingly little literature 
discussing corruption and transaction costs explicitly. Kang (2003) argue that corruption may 
increase, but also decrease, transaction costs depending on how the nature of corruption. 
However, Kang focuses on grand corruption between political elites, and not on petty 
corruption by low-level public officials, which is more relevant in this study.  Corruption and 
uncertainty is however a more common topic. Wei (1997) finds that corruption lowers foreign 
investment in countries, but especially when there is uncertainty about the nature of 
corruption in a country. When there is more uncertainty, investors discount future profits, and 
are discouraged from investing. Brunetti & Weder (1998) actually equate corruption with 
uncertainty, and find that it lowers investment. A related argument is that about quality of 
government and impartiality – when government institutions are partial (for instance 
corrupted), those subject to government intervention are discouraged from investment 
(Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). 
 
The main hypothesis of this paper is thus that projects funded by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act will be less cost-effective in more corrupt states. 
 
The effect of corruption on efficiency of spending has been studied extensively. Using Italy as 
a case, Del Monte & Papagni (2001) show that the effect of public investment is lower in 
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more corrupt regions. Dal Bó & Rossi (2007) find that firms in more corrupt countires use 
more labor to produce the same amount of electric utilities as firms in less corrupt countries.  
 
While the purpose of this paper is to gauge the effects of corruption on the efficiency of 
public spending, other studies have taken the reverse approach. Golden & Picci (2005) tried to 
measure corruption by calculating the discrepancy between public spending on infrastructure 
and actual infrastructure in Italy. They find that the discrepancy correlates to a high extent 
with measures of government malfeasance, which suggests that corruption indeed impairs 
efficiency in public spending.  
 
Data and empirical strategy 
The data in the study is gathered from recovery.org, which provides reports of stimulus 
spending to the public. The cumulative summary for the second quarter of 2010 is used, 
which contains information on about 48000 stimulus projects. Recipients report the amount of 
funds received, as well as the number of jobs created (or kept, if they otherwise would have 
been terminated) by the project. For each project, there is a prime recipient, and in some cases 
sub-recipients. The analysis will focus on the prime recipients, since the number of jobs 
created only are reported on prime recipient level. 
 
Projects vary in size from 1000$ awarded for pavement overlay in Isle of Wight, Virginia, 
creating 0.01 jobs, to 4.3 billion dollars in education grants to california, supposedly allowing 
for the creation or retainment of 34997.77 jobs, including teachers. 
 
In the first level of the modelling, the cost of a project is modelled as a function of the number 
of jobs created in the project, elapsed time since the projects inception, the level of 
completion, the agency that awarded the grant, and the state in which the recipient is located. 
Moreover, the slope of the jobs coefficient is allowed to vary between agencies, since the cost 
of labour varies depending on the nature of the project. For instance, rocket scientists 
employed by NASA probably have a higher salary than construction workers employed by the 
Federal Highway Commission. The slope of the jobs coefficient is also allowed to vary 
between states. Some of the state-level variation in the slope is expected to depend on natural 
factors, such as geography, but some of the variation can possibly be attributed to corruption. 
The state-specific slope will in level 2 be used as the dependent variable. 
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The rationale underlying the decision to model cost as a function of jobs rather than the 
opposite is based on the assumption that projects are initiated in the following way. First, a 
need for a project is identified, such as a road needing repairs, or a research question needing 
investigation. Second, the workload required to carry out the project is calculated, and third, a 
total cost for the project is estimated. Cost is thus a function of jobs, and not the other way 
around. 
 
An alternative approach would have been to model project cost of various factors, but to 
include corruption directly as a determinant of the cost level. However, such a modelling 
approach requires the assumption that corruption imposes an additional cost on the project, 
regardless of size. While reasonable, the theory outlined above instead  states that corruption 
lowers the efficiency in public sector spending. Hence, it is more reasonable to expect that the 
relationship between the scope of the project, proxied by the number of jobs created, and the 
cost of the project is affected by corruption: jobs cost more in more corrupt states. 
 
In the first level, multi-level modelling is employed, to account for the varying slopes and 
intercept of each agency and each state. However, agencies are not nested in states, and states 
are not nested in agencies. The model is hence a non-nested multi-level model, with random 
effects of jobs. The first level equation can thus be written: 
 
(1)                                                
                       
 
 
Where i denotes the project, j the state and k the agency,    is a state-specific intercept,    is 
an agency-specific intercept. COST is the grant amount in dollars, TIME is elapsed days since 
the award date, COMPLETION is a variable indicating how much progress that has been 
made in the project, and JOBS is the number of jobs created or retained by the project, as 
reported by the recipient. 
 
On the second level, the state-specific slope coeffricient of jobs is regressed on the corruption 
level, log population, real GDP per capita, the median wage, and the party of the governor in 
the state. Furthermore, the state-specific intercept from level 1 is included as a regressor to 
rule out the suspicion that different slopes only are an effect of different starting levels. 
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(3)                                                
                                    
                
 
 
How then to measure the main independent variable, corruption? By definition, corruption is 
illegal, and hence secret. Measuring corruption is hence a daunting research agenda in itself. 
Two main corruption indicators will be used in this study. The first is the number of public 
officials per million capita in the state convicted for corruption, which each year is reported 
by the US Department of Justice. This measure has been used by several researchers, for 
different time periods (Alt & Lassen, 2008; Glaeser & Saks, 2006), and has also been 
referenced in popular press such as the New York Times (Marsh, 2008). 
 
Of the 1082 individuals charged with corruption in 2009, 39 percent were federal officials, 9 
percent were state officials, 25 percent were  local government officials and 27 percent were 
private citizens involved in corruption (such as making illegal campaign contributions) 
(Department of Justice, 2010). 
 
Conviction rates have both advantages and drawbacks as a corruption indicator. On the 
positive side, it captures actual and proved corruption rather than perceptions of it. However, 
a high number of convictions can be an indication of an effective judiciary system, rather than 
widespread corruption. To account for this, Meier & Holbrooke (1992) regressed the number 
of convictions per capita on the number of federal judges and US attorneys per capita, as well 
as the percentage of cases backlogged. None of the variables, which it could be argued relates 
to judiciary capacity, had a statistically significant effect. Hence, corruption convictions 
should not only reflect efficiency of the judiciary system.  
 
Furthermore, the data provided by the Department of Justice contains convictions of federal 
officials in the state as well as state and local government officials – corruption in state and 
local government only constitutes about one third of the convictions.
1
 Still, it is likely that 
perception-based indicators are biased by prejudice about the corruption in the states: in a 
New York Times article referencing the conviction numbers, the title of the article (“Illinois is 
                                                          
1
 A future research task is to separate convictions of federal officials from state and local officials. 
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trying. It really is. But the most corrupt state is actually…”) is a play on the fact that Illinois is 
seen as utterly corrupt (Marsh, 2008). The objective numbers of convictions are superior in 
this regard. 
 
To filter out temporary fluctuations, it is necessary to average convictions over several years. 
Glaeser & Saks (2006) have compiled figures for 1976-2002. I add figures for 2003-2009 
using the latest Department of Justice report and calculate the average number of convictions 
per 100 000 inhabitants during the period 1976-2009. 
 
Despite the drawbacks, a perception-based measure will also be tested in the analysis. In a 
survey of state house reporters, Boylan & Long (2003) asked about how widespread they 
perceived corruption to be in the state government they covered. Boylan & Long then 
compute an index from the answers to several questions. A total of 293 responses were 
obtained, for a total of 47 states. While the objective indicator in general is more reliable, this 
measure will be included as a point of reference. Table 1 ranks the five most and least corrupt 
states according to each indicator. 
 
  
 10 
 
Table 1. The five most and least corrupt states according to the number of 
convictions for corruption and a survey of state house reporters. 
Most corrupt 
 Total number of convictions  
per 100000 capita 1976-2009 
Boylan & Long (2003) 
perceptions index 
1 Louisiana (19.3) Ne w Mexico (1.6) 
2 Mississippi (18.5) Rhode Island (1.4) 
3 Alaska (17.3) Illinois (1.1) 
4 North Dakota (17.3) Delaware (1.1) 
5 South Dakota (16.6) Florida (0.9) 
   
Least corrupt 
 Total number of convictions  
per 100000 capita 1976-2009 
Boylan & Long (2003) 
perceptions index 
1 Oregon (2.4) South Dakota (-1.9) 
2 Washington (3.0) Vermont (-1.4) 
3 Utah (3.2) Colorado (-1.2) 
4 New Hampshire (3.5) Iowa (-1.2) 
5 Minnesota (3.6) North Dakota (-1.1) 
   
Comment: Figures in parentheses are the values on each indicator. 
Correlation between the two indexes: Pearson’s R=0.08. 
   
 
Judging from table 1, the correspondence between the two indicators is very low. No state is 
featured on both top or bottom lists. Both North and South Dakota are however ranked as 
among the five least corrupt states when using conviction numbers, but as among the five 
least corrupt states when ranked by state house reporters! The correlation coefficient for the 
two indicators is accordingly very low, R=0.08. If the Dakotas are excluded, the correlation 
coefficient however increases to R=0.35. 
 
Results 
Results of the first-level regression are presented in table 2.
2
 In the fixed part, all variables are 
significant. Of special interest is the coefficient for log(JOBS), which is estimated at 0.419. If 
the number of jobs for a given project increases with one percent, the cost of the project is 
expected to increase with 0.419 percent. The random part shows that there is significant 
variation of the log(JOBS) coefficient, both on the state and agency level. The standard 
deviation of the coefficient is 0.039 among states, and 0.209 among agencies. Variation 
                                                          
2
 To obtain the state-specific coefficients of log(JOBS) for each state, a model with dummy variables for each 
state and interaction terms between the dummy variables and the log(JOBS) variable was also estimated. It 
should however correspond to the one presented in table 2. 
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among states is thus not as large as among agencies, which seems reasonable, as agencies 
require very different types of labor. 
 
Table 2. First stage estimation results. Maximum likelihood 
estimation. Dependent variable: log(COST). 
Fixed part  
log(JOBS) 0.419*** 
(0.034) 
TIME -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
COMPLETION -0.465*** 
(0.009) 
Intercept 41.847*** 
(1.270) 
  
Random part  
Project level:  
Standard deviation of      1.009*** 
(0.004) 
State level:  
Standard deviation of    0.135*** 
(0.015) 
Standard deviation of     0.039*** 
(0.006) 
Agency level:  
Standard deviation of     1.195*** 
(0.126) 
Standard deviation of      0.209*** 
(0.026) 
  
Log Likelihood -54437.266 
Number of projects 37836 
Number of states 50 
Number of agencies 53 
 
The estimated coefficients for each state are displayed in figure 1, excluding Alaska and 
Hawaii for space considerations. A darker red color indicates that cost of a project increase 
more rapidly when the number of jobs increases. The most distinct geographical pattern is the 
cluster of high-cost states to the north and west of (but not including) Tennessee: Mississippi, 
Arkansas, Missouri, Illinois, Kentucky and Virginia. 
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Figure 1. Estimated coefficient of log(JOBS) – the job cost coefficient. 
 
 
Figure 2. Average yearly corruption convictions 1976-2009. 
 
 
In figure 2, the states have been categorized according to the average yearly corruption 
convictions per 100000 inhabitants in the state. Some correspondence can be seen, but there 
are also notable exceptions, like Texas. Texas is located in the group where the coefficient of 
log(JOBS) is highest, but also in the category of states where corruption is least widespread.  
The correlation between the coefficient and the corruptionvariable is Pearson‟s R=0.25, and is 
significant at the 90 percent level. Correlation between the coefficient and the perception-
based measure of Boylan & Long (2003) is Pearson‟s R=0.20, but is not significant. 
Scatterplots for the two correlations are presented in figures 3 and 4. 
 13 
 
 
Figure 3. Scatterplot of the relationship between the coefficient of log(JOBS) and corruption, 
measured as the log of convictions per 100000 capita in the state 1973-2009. R=0.25. 
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Figure 4. Scatterplot of the relationship between the coefficient of log(JOBS) and corruption, 
measured through a corruption perceptions index (Boylan & Long, 2003). R=0.20. 
 
Regression models including the control variables described in the previous section are 
estimated next, using both the objective and the subjective corruption indicators. In table 3, 
models 2 and 4 display the results of these regressions. The coefficient for the objective 
corruption indicator is still significant, albeit only at the 90 percent level, when controlling for 
other possible confounding factors. Corruption measured as the perceptions of state house 
reporters is not significant in either model. 
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Table 3. Second stage estimation results. OLS regression, unstandardized regression 
coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model4 
CORRUPTION 
Log(convictions/100000 capita 
1973-2009)  
0.024* 
(0.014) 
0.020* 
(0.012) 
  
CORRUPTION 
Corruption survey index  
(Boylan & Long 2003) 
  0.014 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(1.792) 
     -0.170*** 
(0.040) 
 -0.171*** 
(0.044) 
Log(POPULATION)  0.018* 
(0.009) 
 0.015 
(0.012) 
Log(LANDAREA)  0.000 
(0.007) 
 0.001 
(0.010) 
GDP/CAP  3.033* 
(1.568) 
 3.011** 
(1.485) 
WAGE  -0.003 
(0.006) 
 -0.004 
(0.007) 
GOVERNOR  -0.005 
(0.013) 
 -0.005 
(0.014) 
     
Intercept 0.368*** 
(0.028) 
7.125*** 
(1.676) 
0.419*** 
(0.007) 
7.256*** 
(1.792) 
N 50 50 47 47 
R
2
 0.061 0.367 0.042 0.323 
R
2
adj 0.042 0.262 0.020 0.201 
*** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10. For model 2 and 4, robust standard errors were used to 
correct for heteroskedasticity.    denotes the state-specific intercept from the first-stage 
model. 
 
 
The intercept from the first stage of estimation is significant in both model 2 and 4, and has a 
negative effect, which could be expected given that cost in the first stage estimation is 
expressed in logarithmic terms: in states where fixed costs is higher (possibly due to 
geography or other constant factors), the cost of adding additional jobs to a project is 
obviously smaller, expressed in percentages.
3
 
 
Log population has a significant and positive effect in model 2, which indicates that the cost 
of jobs is higher in states with a larger population, and more densely populated states. The 
variable is however not significant in model 4, probably because three states are excluded 
from the analysis, which indicates that the result not is particulary robust. 
                                                          
3
 Omitting the intercept control does not affect the implications of the analysis – the p values for the corruption 
coefficients are lowered slightly.  
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State GDP per capita has a positive effect in both model 2 and 4, which probably is an 
indication that costs generally are higher in more wealthy states. The median wage is not 
significant, and neither is the party of the governor. 
 
What are the substantive implications of the results? Moving from the lowest value of 
corruption to the highest value of corruption is expected to increase the value of the 
log(JOBS) coefficient by 0.04. This in turn means that increasing the number of people 
employed in a project in the least corrupt state is predicted to lead to an increase in costs by 
0.39 percent, but with 0.43 percent in the most corrupt state.  
 
But how does it translate to real dollars? The average number of people employed in projects 
that employ more than zero is e
0.456
, which translates to 1.6 people employed, in non-
logarithmic terms. Substituting average values of the variables and coefficients estimated in 
the first stage model (presented in table 2) into equation 1 allows for predicting the cost of the 
average-sized project in the least and most corrupt states. In the least corrupt state, the job-
cost coefficient is predicted to be 0.39, and the average-sized project is expected to cost 
$581626. In the most corrupt state, the job-cost coefficient is predicted to be 0.44, and the 
average-sized project is expected to cost $592329. The difference is 10703 dollars. In this 
case, the average-sized project is 1.8 percent more expensive in the most corrupt state. 
 
While point estimates and predicted values should be taken with a grain of salt, the general 
tendency is clear – corruption decreases the efficiency of public spending. Equally-sized 
projects cost more in states where there is more corruption, when corruption is measured as 
the number of corruption convictions per capita, but not when a subjective corruption measure 
is used. 
 
Conclusion 
A consensus that corruption impairs economic and human development has the latest decades 
emerged in the scholarly community. Corruption has been shown to adversely effect 
economic growth as well as the efficiency of public spending. In this paper, I attempt to test 
whether corruption in the US states has decreased the effect of public spending, and 
specifically stimulus spending. 
 
 17 
 
By estimating the cost of adding additional jobs to a project in each state, a measure of the 
efficiency of public spending is obtained. Variation in this measure, the job cost coefficient, 
can to some extent be explained by the level of corruption in the state. Projects hence increase 
more rapidly in cost in corrupt states as they become bigger than in less corrupt states. 
 
References 
Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2008). Political and judicial checks on corruption: Evidence from 
American state governments. Economics & Politics, 20(1), 33–61. 
Boylan, R. T., & Long, C. X. (2003). Measuring public corruption in the American states: A 
survey of state house reporters. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 420–438. 
Brunetti, A., & Weder, B. (1998). Investment and institutional uncertainty: a comparative 
study of different uncertainty measures. Review of World Economics, 134(3), 513–
533. 
CNN. (2009). What GOP leaders deem wasteful in Senaste stimulus bill. CNNPolitics.com 
(retrieved 2010-12-20). 
Dal Bó, E., & Rossi, M. A. (2007). Corruption and inefficiency: Theory and evidence from 
electric utilities. Journal of Public Economics, 91(5-6), 939–962. 
Del Monte, A., & Papagni, E. (2001). Public expenditure, corruption, and economic growth: 
the case of Italy. European Journal of Political Economy, 17(1), 1–16. 
Department of Justice. (2010). Report to Congress on the activities and operations of the 
public integrity section for 2009. 
Evans, P., & Rauch, J. E. (1999). Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the 
effects of" Weberian" state structures on economic growth. American Sociological 
Review, 64(5), 748–765. 
Glaeser, E. L., & Saks, R. E. (2006). Corruption in America. Journal of Public Economics, 
90(6-7), 1053–1072. 
Golden, M. A., & Picci, L. (2005). Proposal for a new measure of corruption, illustrated with 
 18 
 
Italian data. Economics & Politics, 17(1), 37–75. 
Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., & Nasiritousi, N. (2009). Quality of government: What you get. 
Annual Review of Political Science, 12, 135–161. 
Kang, D. C. (2003). Transaction costs and crony capitalism in East Asia. Comparative 
Politics, 35(4), 439–458. 
Kroleski, A. L., Reville, P. J., & Mangiero, G. A. (2009). The Housing And Economic 
Recovery Act Of 2008. Journal of Business & Economics Research, 7(3). 
Krugman, P. (2009). Stimulus arithmetic (wonkish but important). The New York Times. 
Leff, N. H. (1964). Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 8(3), 8. 
Marsh, B. (2008, December 14). Illinois Is Trying. It Really Is. But the Most Corrupt State Is 
Actually . . . The New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/weekinreview/14marsh.html?_r=1 
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3), 681–
712. 
Meier, K. J., & Holbrook, T. M. (1992). “I Seen My Opportunities and I Took'Em:” Political 
Corruption in the American States. The Journal of Politics, 54(01), 135–155. 
Mo, P. H. (2001). Corruption and Economic Growth* 1. Journal of Comparative Economics, 
29(1), 66–79. 
Reifler, J., & Lazarus, J. (2010). Partisanship and Policy Priorities in the Distribution of 
Economic Stimulus Funds. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (2008). Corruption. Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional 
Political Economy, 551–566. 
Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2008). What is quality of government? A theory of impartial 
government institutions. Governance, 21(2), 165–190. 
 19 
 
de Rugy, V. (2010). Stimulus Facts–Period 2. Mercatus Center Working Paper. 
Wei, S. J. (1997). Why is corruption so much more taxing than tax? Arbitrariness kills. 
NBER. 
Young, A. T., & Sobel, R. S. (2010). Recovery and Reinvestment Act Spending at the State 
Level: Keynesian Stimulus or Distributive Politics? 
 
 
 
 
Appendix. US states ranked according to the total number of convictions of public officials 
for corruption per 100000 inhabitants 1976-2009. 
Rank Name 
Convictions 
1976-2009 Rank Name 
Convictions 
1976-2009 
1 Oregon 2.4 26 Wyoming 8.1 
2 Washington 3.0 27 Georgia 8.1 
3 Utah 3.2 28 Massachusetts 8.3 
4 New Hampshire 3.5 29 Maryland 8.4 
5 Minnesota 3.6 30 South Carolina 8.7 
6 Nevada 3.6 31 Delaware 8.9 
7 Colorado 3.8 32 Hawaii 9.1 
8 Nebraska 4.4 33 Florida 9.3 
9 Vermont 4.5 34 New Jersey 10.4 
10 Iowa 4.6 35 Virginia 10.7 
11 North Carolina 4.7 36 West Virginia 11.1 
12 Arizona 4.7 37 Ohio 11.6 
13 Idaho 5.0 38 Pennsylvania 12.1 
14 Wisconsin 5.1 39 Oklahoma 12.5 
15 Kansas 5.4 40 Kentucky 12.6 
16 Texas 6.0 41 Montana 12.9 
17 California 6.2 42 New York 13.1 
18 Michigan 6.3 43 Tennessee 13.1 
19 Indiana 6.3 44 Alabama 13.7 
20 Arkansas 6.4 45 Illinois 14.1 
21 New Mexico 7.1 46 South Dakota 16.6 
22 Rhode Island 7.6 47 North Dakota 17.3 
23 Connecticut 7.8 48 Alaska 17.3 
24 Maine 7.9 49 Mississippi 18.5 
25 Missouri 8.0 50 Louisiana 19.3 
 
